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Post Keynesian theory as opposed to Walrasian theory does not provide the foundations for a 
unique general equilibrium but claims the existence of multiple equilibrium positions. In this 
article,  such  a  multitude  of  equilibrium  positions  is  explained  by  different  market 
constellations which are characterised by different sets of institutions, political and cultural 
factors and historical circumstance in general and can be formed by collective bargaining 
systems  and  Central  Banking  designs  as  well  as  implicit  or  explicit  mechanisms  of 
coordination between key macroeconomic policy areas in particular. A market participation 
theory of economic policy based on market constellations may help to bridge the gap between 
nomocratic policy denial and teleocratic policy euphoria. 
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1. Macro versus micro perspectives 
 
Ever since the end of the ‘golden age’
1, unemployment has been the most serious and socially 
least acceptable vice of highly developed capitalist economies. Moreover ever since that time, 
economists  had  been  asked  and  expected  to  provide  solutions  to  cure  that  vice  –  a  very 
legitimate demand particularly if a discipline is addressed that often claims to have unveiled 
the laws of economic interaction as much as natural science has discovered natural laws. In 
mainstream  economics
2,  the  story  is  rather  simple:  unemployment  must  be  rooted  in  the 
malfunctioning of the labour market. Either the actors directly involved – employers and their 
organisations or employees and their unions – or the actor providing the legal and institutional 
framework – i.e. the government or state actor regulating labour markets or providing a social 
cushion that influences the decisions of the actors that are directly involved – must in some 
way or the other be blamed for not allowing market forces to do their job. And the bulk of 
theory providing ever more rational for disrupting the allocative process of labour markets has 
become unintelligible: efficiency wage theories, monopolistic union theories, public choice 




Common to all such approaches is a microeconomic perspective which is supposed to provide 
an answer to the question why it may be rational for economic agents not to allow market 
forces to clear the labour market at the equilibrium real wage level. This kind of research 
stance can be understood as a reaction to standard Keynesian reasoning of the Hicks-Hansen 
type which apparently relied completely on ad hoc rigidities (price and wage stickiness) and 
seemed to be irreconcilable with the stagflation period of the late 1970s and, furthermore, 
which was too hydraulic not to be puzzled why governments would find it so difficult to 
restore full employment. In Germany, for instance, the Keynesian ‘Growth and Stability Act’ 
of 1967 has been recognized in helping to overcome the 1966/67 business cycle downturn, but 
seemed incapable of dealing with the coming recessions of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. 
Under these circumstances, the Keynesian focus of explaining unemployment as a systematic 
product of uncoordinated market behaviour – not as a temporary failure of markets to behave 
appropriately  –  has  been  almost  completely  lost:  unemployment  as  an  equilibrium 
phenomenon.  Post  Keynesian  authors  of  different  backgrounds  have  emphasized  the 
importance  of  effective  demand  (constraints)  in  determining  the  overall  volume  of 
employment (and, hence, unemployment) independent of labour market failures.
4  
 
                                                 
* I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Hans Böckler foundation. This paper is part of a larger 
project on ‚Employment systems in international comparison’. My thanks also go to Andrew Watt and Hansjörg 
Herr and Carol Hogg for fruitful comments. However, the usual caveats apply.   
1 See e.g. Marglin/Schor (1990)  
2 For a reference as to what is meant by ‘mainstream economics’ see e.g. Keen (2001:10). 
3 Because of the extent, it is difficult to select just a few references without provoking the critique of not having 
mentioned an important book or article. I will, therefore, concentrate on a few references that provide overviews 
or  international  comparisons:  Akerlof/Yellen  (1986);  Bean/Layard/Nickell  (1986);  Carlin/Soskice  (1990); 
Dreze/Bean (1990); Landmann/Jerger (1999); Layard/Nickell/Jachman (1991); Layard/Nickell/Jackman (1994); 
Lindbeck/Snower (1989); Phelps (1994).  
4  Income  distribution  and  fundamental  uncertainty  resulting  in  liquidity  preference  considerations  play 
prominent roles in different Post Keynesian approaches; for a quick overview of Post Keynesian theories of 
unemployment see King (2001)   3 
Although Post Keynesianism is far from being a well defined and coherent body of economic 




•  In  order  to  understand  the  determination  of  aggregate  variables  such  as  national 
income  and  employment  (as  opposed  to  individual  income  and  individual  labour 
supply  or  demand),  not  microeconomic  but  macroeconomic  models  must  be 
developed. That is to say, that before we will be able to study allocative processes on 
single markets (i.e. the optimal use of given resources in partial analysis), we will need 
to determine the extent to which resources will be used (i.e. the degree of utilisation in 
total analysis) in the aggregate. This is most important for the factor of production 
which can be taken as given (i.e. constant) in the short run and which is as much a 
social category as a factor of production: labour supply, i.e. the number of human 
beings willing (or forced) to sell their services to companies and employers and being 
mostly harmed if they do not succeed. 
•  The environment under which economic agents act is necessarily a fundamentally 
uncertain one. That is to say that economic agents will never be able to dispose, 
collect nor process all the information that is necessary for optimal decisions featuring 
so prominently in neoclassical general equilibrium models. Nevertheless, in order to 
decide (bounded) rationally, economic agents need rules and regulations, habits, codes 
of conduct or institutions that reduce the number of possible alternatives.  
•  One  institutional  fact  features  prominently  in  Post  Keynesian  economics:  money. 
Money is the institution in which not only spot transactions (barter) are denominated 
but  also  such  transactions  which  are  basic  constituents  to  capitalistic  economic 
behaviour:  forward  looking  debt  relations  involving  debtors  and  creditors.  The 
decision to dispose with money (liquidity preference) for a certain period of time (into 
the uncertain future), i.e. to invest and create debtor-creditor-relationships, drives an 
economy. This  also means that nominal  contracts and prices – particularly  money 
wages  and  nominal  interest  rates  –  become  more  important  than  real  magnitudes 
(which do not exist in reality) without involving money illusions.
6  
•  In neoclassical barter or real exchange models, markets are essentially equivalent and 
the Walrasian ‘law of markets’ accounts for an ever equilibrating process. This cannot 
be the case in a monetary production economy which is characterised by a hierarchy 
of markets: the motives and (trans)actions of agents (creditors and debtors) on credit 
markets (sometimes called ‘wealth or asset markets’ in order to distinguish them from 
neoclassical credit markets) logically proceed the (trans)actions on commodity and 
labour  markets  and,  thereby,  set  budget  constraints  for  all  other  market  actors:  in 
Keynes’s terminology, it is the finance motive which builds the (liquidity preference) 
foundation of the investment and income generating production process (Davidson 
1994: 86ff.). 
•  There is neither a single reference point to which capitalist economies tend to move 
(no general equilibrium but multiple equilibria) nor a hydraulic way of governing an 
economy as ‘old fashioned’ standard Keynesianism seemed to believe in the 1960ies 
                                                 
5 Lavoie (1992) mentions four essentials of Post Keynesianism that – at least partly – coincide with our features: 
1) procedural or reasonable rationality; 2) organicism or holism; 3) realism and 4) production (instead of merely 
allocation) 
6 Of course, economic agents are basically interested in real magnitudes. Yet, as the future valuation of all kinds 
of assets is unknown and uncertain (this is true for the pricing of single assets as well as for price developments 
in the aggregate) and contracts are always  denominated in nominal terms, its nominal magnitudes and price (or 
inflation) expectations that count most and – as Keynes put it – we are dealing with a monetary production 
economy.     4 
and 1970s.
7 Different sets of institutions, political and cultural factors and historical 
circumstances (such as  given international monetary systems or degrees of market 
saturation) determine ‘market constellations’
8 under which economic agents act and 
which show some persistence. The political actor or other corporatist actors (such as 
the social partners or Central Banks) as the agents of economic policy in a wider 
sense
9 can in no way be regarded as ‘exogenous’ to market processes. They are not 
simply correcting ‘market failures’ in a predetermined, quasi functional way but they 
are market participants – though important and powerful ones – that are faced with 
uncertain future developments and events and contingent reactions of other market 
participants. The contingency of economic governance becomes ever more obvious 
once the idea of  a unitary political actor is abandoned: if the key macroeconomic 
policy  fields  of  monetary,  fiscal  and  wage  policies  are  controlled  by  independent 
actors and an interdependence of these policy fields is assumed, the actors are set into 
a strategic environment in which the policy outcome depends on the expectations and 
anticipations  of  each  other  and  the  impact  of  such  a  policy  depends  on  the 
expectations and anticipations of the individual market actors.  
 
It is this Post Keynesian basis on which the following analysis is built. Firstly, a market 
participation  theory  of  economic  policy  will  be  outlined  in  very  broad  strokes  and  a 
cooperative  approach  to  macroeconomic  policy-making  portrayed.  This  will  be  needed  to 
determine in which way macroeconomic demand management  can be used to manipulate 
‘market constellations’ in a systematic, though not hydraulic way. In a further step, we will 
inquire as to how far macroeconomic governance can be made responsible to explain different 
growth and employment performances of selected EU countries, or to put it differently: are 
there differences in the ability of nations to create favourable ‘market constellations’? 
 
2. Market participation and the creation of favourable ‘market constellations’ 
 
Once the idea of a general equilibrium as the natural long-term position of any economy is 
replaced  by  a  notion  of  multiple  equilibria,  unemployment  becomes  a  systematic 
characteristic  of  decentralised  market  economies  as  opposed  to  merely  being  a  ‘market 
failure’.  Therefore,  economic  policy  towards  establishing  full  employment  is  not solely  a 
functional device of ‘market repair’ but must be established by a political will (normative 
target) and can only be pursued by way of participating in the market process. Therefore, the 
political actor(s) is not a subject external to the market participants (objects) but a market 
participant (object) himself who is constrained by market forces just like any other market 
                                                 
7 We ought to remember that the heydays of standard Keynesianism coincided with the maximum belief in 
Cartesian controllability via well established means-ends-systems; see Dahl/Lindblom (1963), Tinbergen (1954), 
Tinbergen (1964). 
8 In some recent work (see Fritsche et al. 2005a, Fritsche et al. 2005b) the notion of ‚regime’ has been introduced 
to describe what is termed ‚market constellation’ here. I prefer the latter notion in order to distinguish this line of 
research from those socio-economic models which use the (neo-marxist) term ‘regime’ to describe a specific 
historic  structure  of  accumulation;  see  Boyer  (1990),  Kotz/McDonough/Reich  (1994).  Although  there  are 
certainly similarities between the proposed and the regulationist research programme, they are based on rather 
different  paradigmatic  foundations  (Keynesian  the  former,  Marxian  the  latter)  and  focus  on  very  different 
problems: uncertainty, liquidity preference and money here and profit squeeze and ‘social compromise’ (see 
Coriat/Dosi 2002)  there. But, most important, the regulationist research programme is mainly interested in 
institutional settings in the allocational (labour markets and industrial relations) and distributional (welfare state 
institutions and policies) core functions of economic and public policy (see e.g. Amable [2003: 3ff.]) while the 
Post Keynesian research programme proposed here is principally concerned with the interventionist, stabilisation 
function of economic and public policy.  
9 Economic policy can be interpreted as providing public goods.   5 
participant
10. Governmental (and other corporatist actors) interventions will have measurable 
impacts  on  quantities  and  prices,  but  as  any  other  market  participant,  the  political  (or 
corporatist) actor has finally to accept the market outcome, i.e. cannot ex ante discriminate 
between  warranted  quantity  and  unwarranted  price  effects.
11  Before  trying  to  solve  the 
problem of contingency, the lack of Cartesian policy control shall be highlighted again: the 
political actor is as much an object of market forces as the subject of economic policy making. 
However, there are means to reduce the magnitude of contingency (or lack of sharpness in 
policy  control)  by  way  of  introducing  (codified)  rules  and  regulations  or  setting  up  or 
stimulating institutions that reduce the available number of options for market participants 
and, therefore, decreases the uncertainty about future actions. Obviously, there is a trade-off 
between  transaction  costs  (due  to  the  need  to  adapt  to  changing  market  situations)  and 
uncertainty costs – which leaves the optimal mix of ‘laissez-faire’ and ‘regulation’ open to 
experience.  Yet, uncertainty-reducing institutions and regulations are much easier to justify 
in a Post Keynesian framework than in a neoclassical theory of ‘market failure’ (see e.g. 
Kregel  1980,  Hodgson  1989)  and  can  help  in  creating  a  ‘market  constellation’  which  is 
favourable to growth and employment. 
 
Some of these uncertainty-reducing institutions – with particular respect to our purpose – are 
collective  bargaining  systems,  institutional  settings  of  Central  Banks  and  institutional 
structures to coordinate different independent but interdependent political actors in order to 
establish  an  optimal  policy  mix.  Collective  bargaining  systems  provide  the  necessary 
‘nominal anchor’ in modern non-precious metal (fiat money) currency systems, the Central 
Bank design is important for securing the scarcity of paper money. Both institutional set ups 
reduce otherwise precarious volatility of (nominal) wages and prices: It has become common 
sense that there is a strong correlation between the degree of independence of Central Banks 
and  the  inflation  performance  of  an  economy  on  the  one  hand  and  a  likewise  strong 
correlation between inflation performance and inflation volatility. There is less agreement 
about  the  influence  of  collective  bargaining  systems  on  wage  settlements  and  inflation 
developments. A very influential study by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) propose a ‘hump-
shaped’  link  while  other  evidence  (e.g.  Soskice  1990)  argues  in  favour  of  a  negative 
correlation:  the  more  decentralised  the  collective  bargaining  system  is,  the  higher  wage 
settlements and inflation rates will be.
12 Be that as it may, there is no doubt that collective 
bargaining institutions and the Central Banking design may impinge in a systematic way on 
the degree of uncertainty about inflation developments and the valuation of assets.  
 
Only recently, the mutual causality (Wechselwirkung in a Kantian sense; see Hicks 1979: 
18f.)) of collective bargaining systems and Central Banking designs has been studied in depth 
and some ‘conventional wisdom’ about the (long term) neutrality of monetary policy and the 
‘free lunch’ assumption of Central Bank independence has been shaken
13. Moreover, it has 
                                                 
10 The idea of a ‚market participation theory of economic policy’ as opposed to the traditional ‚market failure 
theory of economic policy’ has been most forcefully put forward by the German Post Keynesian economist Hajo 
Riese.  Unfortunately,  he  and  his  disciples  have  published  almost  exclusively  in  German  and,  hence,  their 
contributions  to  Post  Keynesian  economics  went  internationally  almost  unnoticed;  see  Riese  (1988);  Riese 
(1995); Riese (1998).  
11 As is the case with employment policies. In the case of disinflation policies, the price effects are warranted and 
the quantity effects are unwarranted, yet again it is impossible to plan them in advance. 
12 This relation becomes plausible if we assume strong trade unions at company level (‚local pushfullness’) in at 
least bigger companies and a signalling function of  wage settlements of ‘key companies’ (i.e. bigger, more 
visible companies).  
13 See e.g. Hall/Franzese (1998), Guzzo/Velasco (1999), Cukierman/Lippi (1999), Iversen (1999a). The ‘free 
lunch’ assumption has been particularly discussed by Grilli/Masciandaro/Tabellini (1991), Gärtner (1997), Posen 
(1998), Soskice/Iversen (2000).    6 
been asked whether it is sensible to delegate half of demand management to an autonomous 
body such as the Central Bank (see Rankin 1998, Power/Rowe 1998) – indicating a possible 
coordination problem between fiscal and monetary policies (see Nordhaus 1994). Both lines 
of discussion can be joined by  realising that all actors involved – the  political actor, the 
Central  Bank  and  the  social  partners  –  pursue  individual  utility  maximisation  under  the 
constraint
14 of the Phillips curve trade-off
15, but may (and most certainly will) have different 
preferences with respect to inflation and unemployment. In a moment, we will see how this 
can end up in a policy game which leaves not only the actors involved dissatisfied but also 
produces a sub-optimal result in terms of overall welfare. Therefore, institutions that produce 
incentives for the actors involved – i.e. the political actor responsible for fiscal policy, the 
Central Bank responsible for monetary policy and the social partners responsible for wage 
policy – to cooperate may be able to create market constellations – i.e. a macro-economic 
environment – favourable for growth and employment.  
 
As a three actors’ game is too complex to be exposed, it will be split into two separate games 
in which the Central Bank is the connecting piece. This seems appropriate as it is the Central 
Bank’s monetary policy which is the mutual focus of both wage policy and fiscal policy alike, 
but there is no direct interaction
16 between the latter two. Let us start with the interaction of 
monetary and fiscal policy as portrayed in the so called Nordhaus-model (see Nordhaus 1994 
or Balls/O’Donnell 2002: 101ff.): We assume that (1) the utility functions of both actors 
include  the  variables  ‘unemployment’  and  ‘inflation’,  (2)  both  actors  show  different 
preferences with respect to unemployment and inflation (the Central Bank is more averse to 
inflation than the political actor), (3) there is a (short and long term) Phillips curve trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation, (4) both actors target a (different) volume of aggregate 
demand in order achieve the preferred combination of unemployment and inflation, and (5) 
the  political  actor  additionally  puts  emphasis  on  the  budgetary  balance  as  it  provides  the 
means to offer public goods  to the electorate (necessary to secure re-election). In fig. 1, the M 
and F curves portray the level of aggregate demand which the Central Bank (M) and the 
political actor (F) target respectively. They can do so by choosing a policy mix of monetary 
and fiscal policy here approximated by the instrument variables i (real interest rate) and S 
(budgetary  balance):  the  same  aggregate  demand  can  be  achieved  through  a  more 
expansionary  monetary  policy  and  tighter  fiscal  policy  (i.e.  lower  i  and  higher,  or  more 
positive, S) or, alternatively, through a more restrictive monetary policy in combination with a 
more expansionary fiscal policy (i.e. higher i and lower, or more negative, S).    
 
The  difference  between  the  M  and  F  curve  reflects  the  autonomous  relevance  that  fiscal 
policy (budgetary balance S) has for the political actor. Point A and B represent the ‘optimal’ 
combinations of fiscal and monetary policy as preferred by the Central Bank and the political 
actor: as the Central Bank is more averse to inflation than the political actor, it favour point B 
at  tighter  monetary  policy  and  the  political  actor  favours  point  A  at  more  expansionary 
monetary policy and higher budget deficits (as an expression of the desire to have more room 
                                                 
14 At least in the  short run,  there seems  to be consensus  about the existence of this trade-off among  most 
economic schools. In the long run, the trade off is acknowledge by Post Keynesian theories but questioned by 
neo-classical theories. However, as the time horizon for political action can be assumed as being rather short 
term, this dispute must not be decided here. 
15  In  the  case  of  the  social  partners,  it  is  the  original  Phillips  curve  (linking  nominal  wages  increases  to 
unemployment) which is important. 
16 As is common, I use the term ‚interaction’ although this is not quite correct. ‘Interaction’ describes the actions 
of two (or more) actors in direct relation to one another as, for instance, on markets. In the case of monetary, 
fiscal  and  wage  policy,  the  actors  do  not  act  towards  each  other  but  towards  financial  market  participants 
(monetary policy), the electorate (fiscal policy) and their members (social partners). However, their actions are 
interdependent and this interdependence has to be taken into consideration.    7 
to manoeuvre). Obviously, both points A and B cannot be realised at the same time: either, 
there is some kind of coordination between fiscal and monetary policy and some point C on 
the contract curve will eventually be reached
17 or, in the case of conflict (or non-cooperation), 
we will end up at point D – which is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium – or at point E 
which is a Stackelberg equilibrium
18. Whether the cooperative point C will be preferred as 
compared to the non-cooperative points D and E depends on the preference structure of both 
actors:  The  more  averse  to  inflation  the  Central  Bank  and  averse  to  unemployment  the 
political actor, the less likely it will be that the cooperative point C will be preferred (see 
Heise 2001: 62ff.). Or to put it differently: if both actors do not care only for one of the two 
policy goals of ‘low inflation’ and ‘high employment’, a cooperative effort will be able to 
establish  a  policy  mix  which  both  actors  prefer  to  the  non-cooperative  solutions  of  the 
Stackelberg or Nash equilibria
19. However, such a preferred policy mix will only be achieved 
if the famous cooperation trap of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ can be overcome.       
 




















                                                 
17 Where exactly on the contract curve such a cooperative point C will come to lie depends on the bargaining 
position of both actors. This position is determined by the preference structure of the actors. 
18 A Stackelberg equilibrium can easily be imagined if the political actors accept the structural strength of the 
Central Bank to enforce its level of aggregate demand, although it maintains the enforcement of its preferred 
budgetary balance.  
19 The willingness to cooperate can, therefore, be interpreted as a litmus test of whether they really pursue not 
only a single target policy. Autonomous Central Banks (and the Bundesbank in particular) have often been 
reproached with only pursuing price stability and neglecting employment and growth completely. 
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Here we are not concerned about (institutional) incentives necessary to increase the likelihood 
of cooperation  (see Heise 2001: 73ff.) but will pose the question  whether the underlying 
conflict can be mitigated by bringing the social partners into the picture. Indeed, this would be 
the case, if the social partners were able to prevent inflationary developments (to which the 
Central Bank is more averse than the political actor) to accompany increasing employment 
(which the political actor favours more than the Central Bank) – i.e. if they were able to 
suppress the Phillips curve logic. As the Phillips curve is based on the ‘original Phillips curve’ 
linking inversely nominal wage increases to falling unemployment, social partners may well 
have a stake in the game. From a large number of studies
20 we know that the potential to 
control the Phillips curve logic depends on the ability of the social partners to create external 
effects  (i.e.  nominal  wage  claims  in  excess  of  the  distributional  margin  given  by  labour 
productivity growth and the tolerated inflation rate) and the willingness to internalise such 
external effects: decentralised collective bargaining systems (acting at company level) are said 
neither to expose a willingness to internalise external effects nor to have the ability to create 
such external effects (Calmfors-Driffill case). Centralised collective bargaining systems
21, in 
which  the  social  partners  (and,  most  importantly  the  trade  unions)  act  as  ‘encompassing 
organisations’,  do  have  the  ability  to  create  external  effects  but  will  also  be  willing  to 
internalise them. They will do so once they have realised that any nominal wage increase will 
(ceteris  paribus)  be  completely  passed  on  to  prices  and  leave  the  real  wages  unaltered. 
Intermediate  collective  bargaining  systems  (acting  at  regional  or  sectoral  level),  however, 
have the ability to create external effects, yet they are not willing to internalise them as the 
effect of the nominal wage increases on the overall price level will be a restricted one (for the 
restricted scope – regional or sectoral – of their bargaining power) and, hence, enables them to 
alter their (sectoral or regional) real wage rate
22. This may also be the case with respect to 
decentralised  collective  bargaining  systems  if  we  allow  for  signalling  effects  of  key 
companies and ‘local pushfullness’, i.e. strong and myopic trade unions at company level 
(Soskice case).     
 
Fig. 2 depicts the different settings: w
r
b is the real wage rate which trade unions (as the crucial 
part  of  the  social  partners  in  this  argument)  are  targeting
23  with  respect  to  the  level  of 
employment. LF is the labour force which is, for the sake of simplicity, taken as given. w
r
p is 
the  real  wage  rate  which  the  employers  are  willing  to  accept  (which  is  given  by  labour 
productivity  growth  and  a  mark-up  accounting  for  imperfect  competition  on  commodity 
markets).  In the case of a centralised bargaining system, for a considerable margin trade 
unions  are  willing  and  able  to  suppress  the  ‘Phillips  curve  logic’  –  from  a  level  of 
employment L
N
1 onwards, they will not ask for higher (targeted) real wages but increase the 
utility  of  the  labour  force  (as  their  political  aim)  by  increasing  employment.  Above 
employment  level  L
N
2,  which  can  be  interpreted  as  the  point  at  which  the  number  of 
unemployed equals the number of vacancies
24, real wages will start to increase either through 
higher collective claims or by way of wage drift. Below employment level L
N
1, pressure on 
                                                 
20 See e.g. Franzese (2001), Franzese (2002); Franzese/Hall (2000), Hall (1994), Hall/Franzese (1998), Hein 
(2002a), Iversen (1999b), OECD (1997), Traxler (1999), Traxler/Kittel (2000). 
21 Centralisation means that the collusion of heterogeneous interests into credible commitments is possible; i.e. 
decentralised but highly cooperative trade unions and employers’ organisations may be de jure decentralised but 
act de facto as a centralised collective bargaining system in the above sense.   
22 Soskice (2000: 47) spells out the necessary, yet realistic assumptions: (1) industrial trade unions indeed only 
care about employment and wages of the labour force in their own sector, (2) they bargain independently. 
23 ‘Targeting real wages’ means that trade unions bargain nominal wages under the expectation of price inflation. 
The assumption is that their expectations are met, i.e. no revision of plans is necessary. 
24 This is the ‘Beveridge definition’ of full employment.   9 
trade unions will force them to accept lower (targeted) real wage increases than employers 
would be willing to pay at full employment levels.  
 







































2 depends on implicit or explicit coordination mechanisms: 1) if an institution – a concerted 
action or macro-dialogue – empowers the actors involved to credibly commit themselves to 
pre-established policy rules, the Central Bank may be willing and forced to allow for a level 
of  aggregate  demand  which  reflects  the  preferences  of  the  political  actor  and  the  social 
partners - L
N
2 in this case. This may be called ‘ex ante’ coordination. 2) If the Central Bank 
pursues  a  monetary  policy  of  ‘testing  the  waters’
25  and  the  political  actor  and  the  social 
partners can bring themselves not to exploit the Central Bank’s pragmatism, L
N
2 may also be 
reached – this may be termed the ‘Fed strategy’ for it has allegedly been the policy stance of 
the US Federal Reserve Board during the 1990s (see Bibow 2001, Hein 2002b). Almost the 
same scenario would be imaginable if the political actor was to take the more active (fiscal) 
policy stance,  yet the Central Bank would not react in a restrictive manner but allow for 
aggregate demand to increase (i.e. any point on the contract curve in fig. 1; see also Collignon 
2003: 128ff.) – both cases may be called ‘ex post’ or implicit coordination. However, they 
seem to be a very fragile and rather coincidental forms of cooperation (see e.g. Horn 1999; 
Fritsche et al. 2005a: 102f.) as the incentives for the actors involved not to defect (i.e. not to 
exploit) are not very strong – that at least is what game theory teaches us. 3) If cooperation 
cannot be established, the Central Bank will enforce its level of aggregate demand (at Nash- 
or Stackelberg  equilibrium) preventing employment from rising  above  L
N
1 – this may be 
termed ‘monopolistic coordination’ (see Spahn 2004: 288ff.) or the ‘Bundesbank strategy’ for 
it has allegedly been the policy stance of the German Bundesbank ever since it pursued an 
independent monetary policy (see Hein 2002b). 4) If the Central Bank were to accommodate 
whatever wage and fiscal policy stance
26, again L
N
2 would be at reach, yet at a comparably 
high inflation rate (the exact amount of which depends on the inflation aversion of the social 
partners; see Guzzo/Velasco 1999, Hall/Franzese 2000).       
                                                 
25 A monetary policy stance of ‚testing the waters’ implies a policy of direct inflation targeting with symmetric 
reaction functions (see e.g. Siklos 2004). ‘Testing the waters’ means that Central Banks risk expanding monetary 
policy as long as no inflation potential arises.  
26 In this case, the Central Bank either shows a low degree of independence or is led by a ‚populist Central 
Banker’ (as compared to the ‘conservative Central Banker’ of price stability orientation).   10 
            
As is summarized in tab.1, the market constellations look quite differently when we focus on 
decentralised, non-coordinated (company or industry level) collective bargaining systems: (1) 
If the Central Bank accommodates whatever wage claims and fiscal policy stance arise, the 
inflation rate will certainly be very high and possibly accelerating. As high inflation rates are 
typically associated with high inflation volatility, liquidity preference considerations of wealth 
owners  will  curtail  investment  spending,  economic  growth  and  employment  –  hence, 
employment will be below L
N
2 , but probably above the level which a non-accommodating 
Central Bank under ‘Bundesbank strategy’ would enforce
27; for instance at level L
N
4 . (2) An 
(explicitly) cooperative constellation including a non-accommodating Central Bank and non-
coordinated social partners is hard to imagine as the number of actors (particularly on the side 
of the social partners) is too numerous for a strategic and credible commitment. (3) In the case 
of  a  non-accommodating  Central  Bank,  the  result  will  be  high  unemployment  (L
N
3)  in 
combination with low inflation whatever the Central Bank strategy is. This is at least true as 
long  as  we  assume  an  intermediate  bargaining  level  (industry  or  region)  or  ‘local 
pushfullness’  at  company  level  (i.e.  the  Soskice  case).  (4)  Only  under  the  condition  of 
‘marginalised’,  decentralised  social  partners  (i.e.  the  Calmfors-Driffill  case)  and  a  ‘Fed 




2 – the exact position of the w
r
b 
curve (in fig. 2) depends on the extent of ‘marginalisation’
28. Nevertheless, this is likely to be 
an unstable constellation once disinflationary developments turn into a deflationary process 
due to the lack of a nominal anchor
29.            
 
 Table 1: Unemployment and inflation in various market constellations  
    Monetary and Fiscal Policy mix  
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27 It  must be admitted that  this is a  very risky statement – above all based on empirical observations (see 
Hall/Franzese 2000: 195). Whether an accommodating Central Bank is able to provide market constellations that 
are  more  favourable  to  growth  and  employment  than  the  market  constellations  provided  by  a  non-
accommodating  Central  Bank  under  the  ‘Bundesbank  strategy’  may  well  depend  on  the  extent  of  ‘local 
pushfullness’ of decentralised social partners and the degree of uncertainty about whether this scenario may turn 
into accelerating inflation. 
28 ‚Marginalisation’ would be complete – and thus, the w
r
b curve would cut the w
r
p curve at point L
N
2 – if the 
actors on the labour market were pure ‘price takers’.   




p but definitely no 
equilibrium nominal wage rate. Yet, the ghost of deflation can possibly be banned if demand-management can 
be used efficiently to control employment levels and/ or if downward barriers to nominal wage decline – such as 
effective minimum wages – are introduced.   11 
 
 
Tab.  1  captures  possible  outcomes  for  employment  and  inflation  under  different  market 
constellations which depend on collective bargaining systems, Central Banking designs and 
explicit  or  implicit  mechanisms  of  coordination  between  the  key  macroeconomic  policy 
fields. Assuming that the individual members of a society receive positive utility from low 
inflation and high employment (or, rather, low unemployment), it becomes clear that a non-
accommodative monetary policy, either under the ‘Fed strategy’ or in cooperative orientation, 
coupled  with  a  centralised  collective  bargaining  system  provides  the  best  and  preferred 
market constellations. However, these results merely show that macropolitics matter as much 
as the institutional setting makes  a difference
30. But it should not be  forgotten that these 
results are ‘normative’ in the sense that they solely mark out the ability of the political actors 
to  govern.  In  no  way  do  they  positively  prove  to  what  extent  actual  governments  and 
corporative  actors  use  their  room  to  manoeuvre.  In  the  next  chapter,  we  will  explore 
empirically to what extent differences in macroeconomic performances can be explained by 
different macropolitical governance.  
 
 
3. Macroeconomic governance and economic performance in selected countries 
 
As the focus of investigation will be on monetary, fiscal and wage policy under particular 
external  conditions,  and  as  we  have  realised  that  the  institutional  embeddedness  of 
macroeconomic governance is crucial for the understanding of rooms to manoeuvre and the 
creation  of  market  constellations,  a  multi-country  cross  comparison  does  not  seem  an 
appropriate method to capture the differences in performance as the implicit non-linearity of 
instrumental relations will be better recorded by a narrative approach
31. Moreover, it seems 
more  appropriate  to  focus  on  a  few  countries  only  than  on  country  clusters  (‘models’  or 
‘regimes’) as has become common in modern social science
32 since different macroeconomic 
market constellations may well cut across different ‘models’. The selection of such countries 
follows the comparativistic research designs
33 ‘most similar with different outcome’ and ‘most 
different with similar outcome’. As can be seen from fig. 3, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Austria show rather different labour market outcomes in terms of levels and developments of 
unemployment,  yet  they  are  ordinarily  clustered  commonly  as  ‘coordinated  market 
economies’
34  showing  very  similar  labour  market  (allocational  system)  and  welfare  state 
institutions (distributional system): While Austria experienced an above-average employment 
                                                 
30 Fritsche et al. (2005b) also name the ‚external economic scenario’ as a cornerstone of a particular market 
constellation.  Although  exchange  rate  developments  may  clearly  impinge  on  the  growth  and  employment 
performance of a country (as we will see later) and may also cause monetary and wage policy reactions, I have 
so far not explicitly included the ‘external economic scenario’ into my investigation for one reason: for the 
longest time in the period under investigation, the exchange rates among EMS countries had no instrument status 
as they where fixed among each other. However, real exchange rates being influenced by the wage policy of the 
social partners may well be a strategic variable particularly in small, open economies in fixed currency systems. 
31  For  an  introduction  to  the  ‘narrative  approach’  in  comparative  economics  see  Miron  (1994),  McCloskey 
(1987),  McCloskey  (1990),  McCloskey  (1994).  As  compared  to  highly  sophisticated  econometric  analysis, 
which  may  be  an  important  tool  in  ‘data-mining’,  the  narrative  approach  is  better  able  to  study  complex 
interactions in detail, to identify critical junctures and non-linearities (as may be expected in our case). 
32 See e.g. Esping-Andersen (1990), Coates (2000), Amable (2003).  
33 For the methodology of comparison as ‘quasi experiment’ see e.g. Dogan/Pelassy (1984), Gregory/Stuart 
(1999), Przeworski/Teune (1970). 
34  The  distinction  ‚coordinated  market  economies’  and  ‚liberal  market  economies’  is  borrowed  from 
Hall/Soskice (2001). Quite similar distinctions are called ‘corporatist model’ versus ‘liberal’ model’  or ‘Rhenish 
model’ versus ‘Anglo-American model’ (see Soskcie 1999; Albert 1991) or ‘Keynesian welfare national state’ 
versus ‘Schumpeterian competitiveness state’ (see Jessop 2002).    12 
development over the whole period under investigation (with only a slight divergence from 
that trend since the beginning of the last decade), Germany’s development was much closer to 
the EU-15-average for the first three decades and has sharply moved  below average (i.e. 
showing  higher  unemployment)  since  the  beginning  of  the  last  decade.  The  Netherlands, 
moreover, produces a very average result during the first two decades under investigation 
only to move sharply above average during the 1990s and to keep that position ever since.
35 
And  the  United  Kingdom  reveals  a  quite  similar  outcome  as  the  Netherlands  despite 
considerable  differences  in  labour  market  and  welfare  state  institutions  which  commonly 
groups it with the ‘liberal market economies’.    
     
Figure  3:  Comparative  unemployment  development  in  four  EU  member  states 
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Source: European Economy, Statistical Annex, autumn 2005, own calculation 
 
With respect to inflation (see tab. 4), the three continental EU members (as  ‘coordinated 
market economies’) show a very similar development: during the 1970ies and 1980ies, price 
stability was clearly higher than at EU average – yet, the Netherlands improved their record 
during the 1980s after having fixed the Dutch gilder to the deutschmark and the legendary 
‘Wassenaar accord’ in 1982. During the 1990s and the first half of the following decade, a 
marked  trend  to  price  stability  convergence  can  be  detected  –  partly  a  world-wide 
phenomenon  of  growing  importance  attached  to  price  stability,  partly  a  European 
phenomenon  on  the  ‘Maastricht  road’  to  European  Monetary  Union.  The  UK  (as  ‘liberal 
market economy’) differs with respect to the early decades under investigation but has joined 








                                                 
35  Seemingly,  the  EMU  countries  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  Austria  have  all  done  worse  (to  differing 
degrees) than the non-EMU country Britain – one is tempted to establish a link to the budgetary policy rule of 
‘zero deficits’ enshrined in the European Stability and Growth Pact. As experience is still too short, this cannot 
be tested here but clearly shows that the institutional settings marking a relevant market constellation must be 
expanded in future research to budgetary policy designs (such as the ‘golden rule’ versus ‘zero-deficit rules’).   13 
Figure 4: Comparative inflation development in four EU member states (difference of 
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Notes: Inflation as measured by final consumption deflator 
Source: European Economy, Statistical Annex, autumn 2005, own calculations 
 
In the following, two questions will be posed: a) Are the comparative unemployment and 
inflation  developments  (each  compared  to  the  EU-15-average  as  reference)  explicable  in 
terms of different market constellations created by distinguishable macropolitical governance 
and b) do these results positivistically match the normatively derived hypothesis summarised 
in tab. 1? It must be remembered that a possible mismatch does not necessarily reject the 
underlying theoretical frame but may hint to the fact that political and corporatist actors may 
refuse  to  use  their  room  to  manoeuvre.  In  any  case,  a  mismatch  would  demand  further 
investigation.  
 
Let  us  start  with  putting  the  selected  countries  into  the  frame  of  probable  market 
constellations provided by tab. 1. Before we can do so, we have to qualify the monetary 
policy stance of each country as to whether it must be judged as ‘non-accommodative’ or 
‘accommodative’ and if non-accommodative, whether it follows the asymmetric ‘Bundesbank 
strategy’  or  the  symmetric  ‘Fed-  or  cooperative  strategy’.  Additionally,  we  will  have  to 




38 have provided different indices to measure monetary 
policy orientations. Although the focus of each study differs with respect to legal, institutional 
or functional independence of Central Banks, they all claim to measure the ‘conservativeness’ 
of Central Bankers concerning the priority given to price stability against alternative targets 
(e.g. employment and growth). Or to put it differently: the more conservative a Central Bank, 
the more non-accommodative its policy orientation. However, there is a major problem with 
all these indices: They do not take into account that legally, institutionally or functionally 
dependent Central Banks may, nevertheless, pursue a non-accommodative policy by pegging 
the exchange-rate of their currency irrevocably to some other currency (see e.g. Goodman 
1992).  However,  this  is  very  important  in  the  case  of  our  country  sample,  where  the 
Netherlands and Austria completely pegged their currencies to the deutschmark – leaving no 
                                                 
36  ‚Corporatism’  or,  synonymously  ‘coordination’,  means  the  de  facto  ability  to  behave  as  ‚encompassing 
organisation’ as compared to the de jure degree of centralisation of a bargaining system. 
37 See footnote 24. 
38  See  e.g.  Alesina/Summers  (1993);  Grilli/Masciandaro/Tabellini  (1991);  Cukierman  (1992);  Bade/Parkin 
(1982); Iversen (1999).    14 
room whatsoever for discretion. The Austrian Österreichische Nationalbank (OENB) handed 
monetary  policy  over  to  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  in  1976,  the  Dutch  Central  Bank  de 
Nederlandsche  Bank  (NLB)  followed  in  1984  –  implying  that  their  respective  monetary 
policy stance can henceforth only be judged as ‘non-accommodative/Bundesbank strategy’. 
Even prior to 1976, the OENB was seen as fairly independent (non-accommodative) while 
prior to 1984 the NLB was definitely more accommodative than the Bundesbank (resulting in 
a  continuous  fall  of  the  Dutch  gilder  relative  to  the  deutschmark).  After  pegging  their 
currencies to the deutschmark, the ‘macroeconomic policy game’ changed in the Netherlands 
and Austria: neither fiscal nor wage policy had to take monetary policy actions into account 
when fixing their policy stance. While wage policy in both countries was embedded in an 
institutional framework
39 in order to secure (international) competition-led wage settlements, 
fiscal policy was free to target employment or alternative goals (e.g. fiscal consolidation). The 
British Bank of England (BoE) was only granted (instrumental) independence in 1998 by the 
New Labour Government under Tony Blair. Until then, it was a subordinated part of the 
Treasury  which  was  commonly  translated  into  a  (very)  accommodative  monetary  policy 
stance. However, monetary restriction as part of the monetarist macroeconomics favoured by 
Margret Thatcher’s governments since 1979 can hardly be described as ‘accommodative’. 
Yet, as monetary and fiscal policies were still combined in the hand of a unitary actor (The 
Treasury), no non-cooperative strategic policy game was to be feared and a strategic policy-
targeting (breaking the inflation expectations in the 1980s, stabilising aggregate demand and 
employment in the 1990s
40) was still possible.      
 
It seems easier to place the selected countries in the ‘coordinated-non-coordinated’ range of 
collective bargaining systems. Although many studies
41 claim Germany and the Netherlands 
legally as intermediately centralised bargaining systems (with dominant industry bargaining 
level), the high coverage rate (80 – 90%) and cooperative organisational structures within the 
employer’s  and  employee’s  organisations  allow  us  to  group  them  alongside  Austria  as 
‘coordinated  collective  bargaining  systems’  while  the  UK  must  be  regarded  as 
‘uncoordinated’ (with dominant company bargaining level). Moreover, there are signals that 
the ‘local pushfulness potential’ of company-level actors has suffered during the reforms of 
the Thatcher administrations (see Heise 1999: 89ff.; Glyn/Wood 2001) and we have come a 














                                                 
39 In the Netherlands, the tripartite ‚Socio-Economic Council’ and the bipartite ‚Stichting van de Arbeid’ must be 
mentioned, in Austria it is the tripartite ‘Economic and Social Council’. At this point, we will simply ignore the 
specific institutional designs and incentive systems. 
40 For the sequencing of economic policy during the Thatcherite monetarist reforms see e.g. Minford (1988); 
Healey (1993). 
41 Schmitter (1981); Calmfors/Driffill (1988); Cameron (1984)   15 
Table 2:  Unemployment and inflation in different market constellations – hypothesis 
and reality       
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Mix   




Non-Accom. –  
ex post 
coordination 
(Fed strategy and/or 
active fiscal policy) 












































UNR: low  
INF: low 





























































UNR: high   








































   
Notes:  Italic-bold  =  country  example  (hypothesis);  Bold  =  empirical  average;  UNR  = 
standardised unemployment rates; INF: GDP-deflator; figures show averages since 1970 (or 
as otherwise stated) 
Sources: European Economy, various issues; own calculations 
 
Taking into account that the figures in tab. 2 show averages over periods of different length 
and have different levels to start from
42, there seems to be no obvious mismatch between the 
hypothetical levels of inflation and unemployment in different market constellations and the 
empirical picture of the selected countries: the continental economies of Germany, Austria 
and  the  Netherlands  combining  a  non-accommodative  Bundesbank  strategy  with  highly 
coordinated collective bargaining systems have done considerably better in both inflation and 
employment performance
43 than the UK and its non-coordinated bargaining system in the 
realm of monetarist non-accommodative monetary orientation since the 1980s. Yet, the UK 
has seemingly gained from its move to a more Fed like Central Bank design since the early 
1990s and changes in wage-setting behaviour in line with the Calmfors-Driffill case (see e.g. 
Barrell/Weale 2003). However, presupposing the developments portrayed in fig. 3 and 4, it 
remains to be clarified why the Netherlands did not do better, particularly with respect to 
                                                 
42 The UK, for instance, displays an unemployment rate of 3.8% on average during the period 1970 – 1979 and 
7.0% on average during the period 1990 – 2004. The former is assessed as ‘medium’ while the latter is assessed 
as ‘medium to low’ – which seems odd. Yet 3.8% during the first period was, after the ‘golden age’ of the 1960s, 
just about European average, while 7.0% is, after the stagflation period of the 1970s and stagnation of the 1980s, 
well below the European average and, particularly, masks a rapidly falling trend.     
43 Both dimensions are often combined to form the ‘misery index’.   16 
unemployment, during the period until 1984, and why Germany has been doing so badly in 
recent  times





This  paper  only  made  a  start  to  explaining  and  assessing  economic  policy-making  in  the 
analytical frame of market participation and the creation of market constellations. It has been 
argued  that  a  set  of  institutional,  cultural  and  political  factors  form  peculiar  market 
constellations if they show some persistence. These market constellations may, on the one 
hand, explain the exact position of an economy where the theoretical foundation – e.g. a Post 
Keynesian model – is merely able to describe multiple equilibrium positions. On the other 
hand, market constellations may also be shaped by institution-building and may, thus, reduce 
the magnitude of contingency in policy control without propagating the idea of hydraulic 
policy  control
45  –  i.e.  formability  (Gestaltbarkeit)  without  Cartesian  creatability 
(Machbarkeit). 
 
Of course, there are still many more questions to pose and answer: Can the general impression 
given in tab. 2 be confirmed once a more detailed empirical investigation follows? If a non-
accommodative monetary policy orientation mixed with a coordinated collective bargaining 
system  establishes  a  market  constellation  most  favourable  to  general  welfare,  which 
institutional setting may guarantee a cooperative or Fed-strategy to systematically prevail as 
opposed to coincidental outcomes depending on personal attitudes (of Central Bankers)
46? 
Are more uncoordinated collective bargaining systems really prone to instability – the UK 
experience  over  the  past  decade  seems  to  suggest  a  less  sceptical  outlook  (see  e.g.  Glyn 
2005). Or are there institutional incentives not yet detected? Can different budgetary policy 
designs (i.e. ‘zero-deficits rules’ versus ‘golden rules’) be identified and integrated into the 
market  constellation  framework?  If  market  constellations  only  provide  the  room  to 
manoeuvre, which institutional incentives can be given to be sure that any room to manoeuvre 
will be used? 
 
Research into market constellations and macroeconomic policy-making is work in progress. 
However, eventually it may fill the wide gap between nomocratic policy denial on Hayekian 
premises and teleocratic policy euphoria on (standard) Keynesian premises which has led the 









                                                 
44 A politico-economic interpretation is given in Heise (2005a) and Heise (2005b). 
45  One  of  the  most  eminent  Post  Keynesian  scholars,  Thomas  I.  Palley,  speaks  of  ‚structural  conditions’ 
favourable  to  Keynesian  demand  management  (Palley  1998:  103).  The  foregoing  analysis  has  provided  an 
interpretation of what Palley might have meant. 
46 There is a long tradition on attributing considerable importance to such personal factors; see e.g. Friedman 
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